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ABSTRACT
Evidence shows that individuals do not always take tax attributes into ac-
count when making their choices. We focus on tax relief for charitable contri-
butions. Although rational donors should view a match and a rebate of the
same value as being equivalent, survey evidence shows that nominal dona-
tions are more likely to adjust in response to a change in the rebate than to a
corresponding change in the match. We argue that these patterns are consis-
tent with the predictions of a model of rational inattention, whereby a major-
ity of individuals choose to process rebate changes while forgoing to process
match changes.
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There is an increasing amount of evidence, both from the lab and from the field, to suggest
that agents do not process all of the parameters relating to the choices that they face.1 A
framework that has increasingly been invoked in the literature for thinking of inattention
in decision making is one where goods’ values and prices are determined by both “vis-
ible” attributes, and by “shrouded” or “opaque” attributes.2 Visible attributes are fully
noticed and processed by agents. Opaque or shrouded attributes, on the other hand may
not be fully processed. In such situations, perceived valuations may differ from true val-
uations, which can lead to deviations from the optimal choice that would be prescribed if
all attributes were fully salient.
To date, the literature on non-salience has focused on understanding the implications
of divergences between individual perceptions of valuations and true valuations by ex-
ploring how individuals’ choices respond to the shroudedness of the attribute (Brown et
al., 2008; Chetty et al., 2009), or to the salience of the shrouded attribute (Chetty et al., 2009;
Finkelstein, 2009), or to the number of competing incentives (“stimuli”) (DellaVigna and
Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009).3 An aspect that has not been fully studied, although
it has been mentioned by Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and by Chetty et al. (2009),4 is the
possibility that the non-processing of attributes may be deliberate. Attention is a scarce
resource and so competition for attention leads to individuals attempting to simplify the
decision making process by choosing not to make use of all available information – a
choice that will depend on the number and strength of competing processing demands
and the costs of the mistakes that non-processing entails. A possible reason for this omis-
sion in the literature lies in the nature of the evidence that has thus far been collected
– in all of the studies mentioned choices are made on quantities and not expenditures.
This means that there can be no differences in the costs of paying attention to different
attributes if those attributes have the same effect on the price.
In this paper, we look at the decisions individuals make in response to changes in pa-
rameters that are in principle equivalent but for which non-processing results in different
deviations from optimality. The specific case we focus on is that of tax incentives for char-
itable donations in the UK tax system. The UK case is ideal for this purpose because the
main scheme through which donors get tax relief on their donations has both a match and
rebate element, at least for higher-rate taxpayers. In principle, a match and a rebate are
equivalent ways of subsidizing private donations, lowering the price of giving to charity.
1See DellaVigna (2009) who provides an overview and analysis of existing literature.
2This description paraphrases the simple model described by DellaVigna (2009). He uses the term
“opaque” to describe the nonvisible component of a good’s value. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) define a
shrouded attribute as a product attribute that is hidden even though it could be nearly costlessly revealed.
3Other evidence of inattentive behaviour has also been found on research addressing rebates for car
purchases (Busse et al., 2006) and sticky prices in macroeconomics (Sims, 2006).
4Gabaix and Laibson (2006) discuss “defined rules of behaviour” whereby agents look only one step
ahead when making decisions in a dynamic framework. Chetty et al. (2009) discuss the relationship be-
tween cognitive costs and salience.
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However, given that what donors must choose is a nominal donation – the amount they
give, inclusive of the rebate but net of the match rather than the match-inclusive amount
the charity receives – their gross donation – the consequences of inattention to the match
and to the rebate are different. By examining how individuals respond to changes in one
or the other we are able to examine whether patterns of inattention are consistent with
the ranking of the associated inattention costs – which would point to inattention being
the result of an endogenous, rational decision.
Our data comes from our own survey of UK donors, who were asked to report what
donations they would be likely to make under the current tax system as well as under al-
ternative tax treatments comprising amatch, a rebate or a combination of the two. We find
that the majority of donors do not report changes in their donations out of net-of-tax in-
come – their nominal donations – in response to changes in either thematch or the rebate.5
Nevertheless, we find that individuals are more likely to adjust their nominal donation
in response to a change in the rebate than they are likely to do in response to a change
in the match. As this gap is observed both for those who do not reclaim the rebate as
well as for those who do, the difference cannot be attributed to the presence of additional
administration costs for the rebate. Eckel and Grossman (2008) suggest that differences
in match and rebate elasticities may stem from framing effects – a “co-operation frame”
induced by the match, compared to a “reward frame” induced by the rebate (Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2006). However, rationalizing such differences as arising from framing effects
related to differential warm glow is problematic. Moreover, differential framing effects do
not account for why so many people do not change their nominal donations in response
to changes in either the match or the rebate, nor why this inertia in nominal donations is
comparatively more marked for small donors than it is for larger donors.
Instead, we argue that the patterns of adjustment we observe across modes of delivery
and across different donor types are consistent with “rational inattention” – a deliberate
choice of neglecting to process comparatively unimportant information in the donation
decision if doing so involves some (small) cost. If the apparent non-salience of a tax
attribute is the result of a deliberate choice by individuals, then we would expect such
choice to vary across individuals depending on their different circumstances; specifically,
we would expect individuals to be less likely to neglect a certain tax attribute the more
significant are the consequences of doing so in their particular case. In our survey design,
the changes in tax incentives (match and/or rebate) are all equally explicit, so differen-
tial shroudedness does not appear to be a likely explanation for non-salience. However,
unlike in earlier studies on salience, our survey evidence makes it possible to compare
different tax attributes that are in principle equivalent but that vary with respect to their
implications for the concrete actions individuals need to take in order respond to them.
5This implies that – in line with previous experimental studies – gross donations respond significantly
more to changes in the match than they do to changes in the rebate. Those experiments were carried out in
the laboratory and in the field, although they did not focus on responses to broad based tax incentives.
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In those earlier studies individuals choose quantities, not expenditures; this means that
different instruments that have an analogous effect on the price will carry the same inat-
tention cost. In our case, donors must choose nominal values, gross of the rebate they can
reclaim but net of the match that the charity receives; this means that changes in match
and rebate that have an equivalent effect on the price of giving require them to perform
different adjustments in their nominal donations, and thus involve different inattention
costs. This feature, which is specific to subsidies to charitable contributions, enables us to
relate observed patterns of responses to predictions of a model of giving under rational
inattention – which we present in the second part of our paper.
As we show, the main prediction of such a model is that, no matter what the under-
lying preferences of donors are, if the expected change in match or rebate is small, or the
planned donation is small relative to the cost of inattention, donors will not adjust their
nominal donations in response to subsidy changes. Thus, some donors will not adjust,
and larger donors are more likely to be amongst those who do adjust. Furthermore, in
a rational inattention framework the parameters that would characterize choices under
full attention can be related to the relative likelihood of adjusting nominal donations to
changes in either match, rebate, or both. Specifically, if the underlying, full-attention price
elasticity of giving is greater than unity in absolute value, we should be more likely to ob-
serve people adjusting nominal donations either in response to rebate changes only or
in response to both match and rebate changes, but we should not observe donors only
adjusting in response to match changes.
In line with these predictions, our survey evidence indicates that donors who make
larger donations are more likely to adjust their nominal donations in response to changes
in the match or rebate. Also in line with this interpretation and with independent em-
pirical evidence on the price elasticity of giving – which imply that larger adjustments in
nominal donations are required in response to changes in the rebate in comparison with
price equivalent changes in the match – those who do adjust their nominal donations are
more likely to adjust to changes in the rebate than to changes in the match, and almost all
of those who adjust to changes in the match also adjust to changes in the rebate.
Although these findings are for subsidies to private giving, they shed light on the
wider question of whether and why tax parameters are salient to individuals’ decisions,
suggesting that non-salience is a manifestation of processing costs that are fully inter-
nalized by individuals. Even more broadly, our findings hint that processing constraints
should not be too readily dismissed in favour of alternative explanations when trying to
account for non-standard responses.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out a basic theoretical
framework for thinking about donation responses to tax incentives, and discusses previ-
ous evidence on giving responses resulting from changes in the price of giving. Section
3 describes the survey and presents the main findings and Section 4 discusses alternative
explanations for them. Section 5 presents a model of rational inattention and relates its
predictions to our findings. Section 6 concludes.
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1 Private donations, the price of giving, and fully-attentive
responses to tax relief
In this section we outline a basic model of rational giving choices. This will be used as a
frame of reference for our discussion of the evidence and of possible interpretations for it.
Consider an environment with n donors consuming a combination of private con-
sumption, x(i), and collective consumption services, G, which are provided by private
contributions, g(i), of individual i, where i ∈ (1, . . . , n). That is, total provision is G =
∑i g(i). Then, for a given level of contributions by everyone else, G(−i) = ∑j ￿=i g(j), the
payoff to individual i as a function of her contribution, g(i) can be represented by
U
￿
y(i)− g(i),G(−i) + g(i), g(i)￿. (1)
where U is monotonically increasing and quasi-concave in all its arguments; and where
y(i) is individual i’s gross income (making private consumption equal to x(i) = y(i) −
g(i)), and where the third term reflects the “warm glow”, w(i) = g(i), that individu-
als may derive from their own contributions towards collective consumption (Andreoni,
1988, 1990).
Now suppose that contributions benefit from tax relief and that this relief consists of:
(i) a tax rebate: every dollar nominally donated to a charity entitles the donor to a tax
rebate of r cents; and (ii) a direct match: every dollar of nominal donation to a charity
is matched by a government grant to the charity equal to m cents. What this implies is
that a nominal donation of d dollars, receives gross funding of (1+ m)d at a cost to the
donor of (1− r)d; thus, the ratio of cost to gross funding from the point of view of the
donor – the price of giving – is p = (1− r)/(1+ m). Both the match and the rebate have
the effect of lowering the price of giving. The first argument in U(·) then becomes equal
to y(i) − pg(i) = y(i) − ￿(1 − r)/(1 + m)￿g(i), where g(i) = (1 + m)d(i) is the gross
donation, i.e. the amount received by the charity.
Each individual chooses g(i) so as to maximize his or her own utility, taking as given
the tax relief6 and all others’ contributions. An interior optimal choice of g(i) for individ-
ual i is then characterized by the first-order condition7
UG +Uw(i)
Ux(i)
= p. (2)
An increase in thematch or the rebate lowers p, and, assuming normality, unambiguously
raises g(i). The effect on net donations pg(i) of a decrease in the price is ambiguous. For
6Making m and r exogenous to the individual’s maximization problem implies that individuals cannot
“see behind” the government’s budget constraint. In an economy with a large numbers of agents, this
assumption appears plausible and is consistent with the assumption that fiscal instruments, such as distor-
tionary taxes used to fund tax incentives, are viewed by individuals as being unlinked from spending.
7Arguments of U have been suppressed for notational simplicity. Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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example, a price elasticity of −1 for gross donations, g(i), implies that net donations,
pg(i), do not adjust to changes in the price of giving, a response which is fully consistent
with a rational model of giving.8
The combination of match and rebate on a nominal donation of d amounts to a sub-
sidy of s￿ = 1− (1− r)/(1+m) = (m+ r)/(1+m) on a gross donation of g = (1+m)d.
We would therefore expect a rational donor to be indifferent between a policy that com-
bines a rebate and a match and a policy that subsidizes gross donations at a rate s￿; and
we would expect that a donor would rationally respond to the replacement of a combi-
nation of match and rebate with a subsidy s￿ by adjusting her nominal donation to d￿.
More generally, we would expect that a rational donor should be indifferent between
two different combinations (m￿, r￿) and (m￿￿, r￿￿) of match and rebate levels such that
(m￿ + r￿)/(1 + m￿) = (m￿￿ + r￿￿)/(1 + m￿￿). This conclusion is independent of the ex-
tent to which giving is driven by collective consumption concerns (the second term in (1))
or by private concerns (the third term in (1) – warm glow).
However, recent evidence from experiments in the laboratory and the field suggest
that the match and rebate are not equivalent, and, in particular, that gross donations are
more responsive to an increase in the match than they are to an equivalent increase in
the rebate.9 In light of the standard model of rational giving choices, this gap is puz-
zling. To investigate what might lie underneath such differential responses, in this study
we collect survey evidence on responses to changes in match and rebate based subsidies
delivered through the tax system, and examine patterns of adjustment across different
donor types, with respect to both the proportions of donors who adjust and the size of
their adjustments, and compare them with the patterns that would be predicted by alter-
native, competing explanations.
8Empirical evidence on the responsiveness of giving to changes in its tax-adjusted price is, however,
mixed: early studies (summarized by Clotfelter, 1985, Steinberg, 1990, and Triest, 1998) suggested that the
price elasticity of giving is negative and greater than unity in absolute value, but more recent studies have
shown that, after correcting for short-term price effects, estimates of price elasticities are smaller: Randolph
(1995) uses panel data to find a long-run price elasticity of giving of −.51; using a longer but similar panel
to that used by Randolph but a different estimation technique, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002), arrive at
the significantly higher estimate of −1.26; more recently, Bakija and Heim (2008) find a long-run value of
−.7 – close to Randolph’s estimate. Surveying these studies, Andreoni (2007) concludes that the literature
is “unsettled as to the true values of price elasticities”.
9Eckel and Grossman (2003) tested responses to match and rebate in a lab experiment that involved
181 undergraduate students each given twelve allocation problems varying in the initial endowment and
match and rebate rates. In the experiment, match rates resulted in gross donations that were up to two
times greater than the equivalent-value rebate. The estimated match elasticity was −1.14 compared a re-
bate elasticity of −.36. Similar results were obtained from a field experiment they conducted (Eckel and
Grossman, 2008). Based on approximately 7,000 responses to a mail-out on behalf of Minnesota Public Ra-
dio, offering match rates resulted in a higher level of gross donations than equivalent-value rebates. The
estimated elasticity of gross donations was −1.05 in the case of the match rate and −.11 in the case of the
rebate rate.
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2 Evidence from a survey: hypothetical changes in theUK’s
Gift Aid scheme
Unlike in the US, where tax incentives for giving are in the form of a deduction, the
main system of tax relief on donations in the UK offers a match subsidy, combined with
an additional rebate subsidy for higher rate taxpayers. The scheme, known as Gift Aid,
works as follows. Individuals donate to charity out of their net-of-tax income. The charity
can reclaim tax relief at the basic rate of tax, currently 20%. This means that for every £1
donated to charity, the charity gets a match equal to 25 pence. In addition, higher-rate
taxpayers (taxpayers with annual gross taxable income in excess of a given level – £37,400
in 2009) can reclaim a rebate equal to the difference between the higher rate of tax at 40%
and the basic rate of tax at 20% on the gross equivalent donation, i.e. the amount before
basic rate tax was deducted. This means that for every £1 donated out of net income, a
higher-rate taxpayer can get an additional rebate of 25 pence. For higher-rate taxpayers,
therefore, the price of giving £1 of funding to a charity is 60 pence.
Given the presence of both a match and a rebate element for higher rate taxpayers,
the UK case provides an ideal opportunity to compare the effect of instruments that can
be equivalent in terms of their effects on the price of giving but that involve different
calculations (and actions) on the part of individuals. Specifically, since donors directly
select nominal donations – i.e. the donation gross of the rebate but net of the match –
failing to process (and respond to) changes in the match component and failing to process
(and respond to) changes in the rebate component have different implications for the
effective donation made by the individual, both in terms of its net cost to the donor and
in terms of the corresponding gross amount received by the charity.
Invitations to take part in our on-line surveywere e-mailed to 40,000 UK-based donors,
split equally between those with a Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) charity account and
those who had donated online through Justgiving (an online giving portal) during the
previous six months.10 We collected pseudo-panel information by asking individuals
about a likely donation under the current tax system as well as likely donations under
alternative systems.
The overall design of our survey is analogous to that of recent field experiments –
individuals were randomly allocated across treatments offering different levels of match
and/or rebate subsidy in order to test how donations respond.11
10CAF is a charity that, among a range of services for individuals and charities, provides a charity account
to donors to facilitate tax-efficient giving. Justgiving is an online giving portal that processes donations from
individuals direct to charity and individual sponsorships of charity fundraisers. The response rates were
9.86% among the CAF sample and 9.19% among the Justgiving sample.
11For practical reasons, the treatments in our study were purely hypothetical: we asked respondents to
consider how the alternative tax treatments would affect a specific donation that they were likely to make in
the next six months. There is an obvious potential concern that our results may be affected by hypothetical
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Our analysis focuses on a sub-sample of 1,442 higher-rate taxpayers, the group faced
with both match and rebate elements; for basic rate taxpayers, Gift Aid is purely a match
on their net-of-tax donation. Respondentswere randomly allocated to five different “treat-
ments”, each of which contained two hypothetical scenarios reflecting different combina-
tions of match and rebate. The way these scenarios were described to respondents in the
survey reflects the way Gift Aid is currently portrayed to donors – the charity receives
m pence for every £1 of nominal donations and the individual can reclaim r pence for
every £1 of nominal donations. For the purpose of the discussion that follows, we shall
mainly focus on two of these treatment groups – sets A and B – consisting of higher-
rate taxpayers who faced scenarios that isolate changes in either the match or the rebate.
Specifically, in addition to the baseline scenario of a 25 pence match and a 25 pence rebate
(corresponding to a price of giving equal to 60 pence on the pound), respondents in set
A (283 respondents, average initial donation £2,169 ) were faced with the following two
scenarios:
(A.1) A match of 30 pence and a rebate of 25 pence (price of giving = .577);
(A.2) A match of 25 pence and a rebate of 30 pence (price of giving = .560).
For set B (289 respondents, average initial donation £2,827), donors were faced with the
following two scenarios:
(B.1) A match of 20 pence and a rebate of 25 pence (price of giving = .625);
(B.2) A match of 25 pence and a rebate of 20 pence (price of giving = .640).
Thus, respondents in sets A and B respectively face decreases and increases in the price
of giving relative to the baseline price of 60 pence. Scenarios for other three treatment
groups involved eliminating the match altogether and increasing the match.12
Using the information on individuals’ initial donations under the current tax treat-
ment and (up to) two donation levels in each of the S hypothetical scenarios, we estimate
or strategic bias (see Harrison and Rutstro˝m, 2006). However, our findings suggest that these problems
were not serious in practice. The survey itself contained a number of consistency checks. For example,
we deliberately included the same treatment twice but in a different order to test for so-called “embedding
effects” (responses depending on the way, and the order, in which questions are presented; see Diamond
and Hausman, 2002).
12The match rates are respectively .50 and .30 for the fifth and sixth scenarios (544 respondents); .37 for
the seventh scenario (271 respondents); and .66 for scenario number eight (267 respondents). The fifth
and sixth scenarios are included in different treatments to test for embedding effects and so have a larger
number of respondents. Tests for systematic variation in initial donations across scenarios reveal that none
of the differences is statistically significant, indicating that the random allocation across treatment groups
was effective.
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Table 1: Responses – main results
 1 
 
Main results   
  Regression results: 
Dependent variable = 
 ln (gross donation) 
  
 
Scenario 
Treatment: 
     m = match 
      r  = rebate 
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Standard 
Error 
(3) 
Implied 
elasticity  
(4) Proportion of 
donors adjusting 
nominal donation 
Current m = 0.25, r = 0.25     
A.1 m = 0.30, r = 0.25    .0543 (.0046) !1.42 .108 
A.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.30    .0332 (.0047)   !.50 .243 
Number of respondents = 288 
B.1 m = 0.20, r = 0.25 !.0353 (.0046)  !.85 .059 
B.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.20   .0062 (.0047)    .09 .123 
Number of respondents = 287 
Total number of respondents (all treatments) =     1,442 
Total number of observations                         =     4,216 
 
Results, by whether or not higher-rate taxpayer reclaims 
  
Regression results: 
Dependent variable = 
ln (gross donation) 
  
 
Scenario 
Treatment: 
     m = match 
      r  = rebate 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(2) 
Standard
Error 
(3) 
Implied 
elasticity  
(4) Proportion of 
donors adjusting 
nominal donation 
Non-reclaimers      
A.1 m = 0.30, r = 0.25    .0417 (.0063) !1.09 .060 
A.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.30    .0137 (.0063)   !.21 .090 
B.1 m = 0.20, r = 0.25  !.0329 (.0065)  !.79 .024 
B.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.20    .0204 (.0065)     .31 .120 
Number of respondents                                  =    259 
Total number of respondents (all treatments) =    633 
Total number of observations                         = 1,870 
Reclaimers      
A.1 m = 0.30, r = 0.25    .0654 (.0064) !1.71 .149 
A.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.30    .0505 (.0065)   !.76 .378 
B.1 m = 0.20, r = 0.25  !.0372 (.0063)       !.89 .086 
B.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.20  !.0050 (.0063)   !.08 .225 
Number of respondents                                  =    316 
Total number of respondents (all treatments) =    809 
Total number of observations                         = 2,345 
 
the following random-effects model to obtain the percentage change in donations associ-
ated with each distinct scenario, s:13
ln gis = α+
S
∑
z=1
βz Iiz + vis, s ∈ Sˆ
￿
t(i)
￿
, (3)
where gis is the (gross) donation of individual i under scenario s – with gi0 representing
the individual’s initial donation; vis = γi + uis includes a fixed, individual-specific term,
γi, which captures the effects of observed and unobserved donor characteristics on do-
nations, as well as a zero-mean, IID error term, uis; Iiz (z ∈ S) are indicator variables for
each of the eight distinct counterfactual scenarios (Iiz = 1 if z = s and Iiz = 0 if z ￿= s);
t(i) (= 1, . . . , 5) is the treatment group to which respondent i belongs, and Sˆ(t(i)) is the
subset of counterfactual scenarios (including s = 0) that feature in treatment group t(i).
The results are reported in Table 1, which also provides an estimate of the elasticity
of gross donations for each scenario (column (3)) based on the reported change in gross
donations and the associated price change, and reports the proportion of respondents
who say that they would adjust their donations for each scenario (column (4)).
13This is efficient and unbiased if the rebate and match terms are unrelated to individuals’ characteristics:
since the rebate and match terms are randomly allocated to individuals this should be true by assumption.
After running a specification test, we could not reject the random-effects specification against a fixed-effects
specification.
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Across the sample, the response in gross donations to a change in the match is signif-
icantly greater than the response to a similar-sized change in the rebate. The estimated
match elasticity is −1.42 for an increase in the match (set A, scenario 1) and −.85 for a
decrease in the match (set B, scenario 1); for changes in the rebate, the corresponding
estimates are −.50 and .09.14
In all scenarios, the majority of people report that they would not adjust their nominal
donations in response to the change in tax treatment, with individuals making larger
donations being overall more likely to adjust (Figure 1). In itself, the finding that nominal
donations do not change when there is an increase in the match would, as mentioned
above, imply a price elasticity of giving of −1, which is not out of line with the earlier
estimates. However, nominal donations also not changing when there is an increase or
decrease in the rebate would imply a rebate-price elasticity of 0. Observed responses
therefore present a puzzle from the perspective of the standard rational choice model.
One may be concerned that this finding on non-adjustment may be an artefact of the
hypothetical nature of the survey. Since calculating the optimal level of donation associ-
ated with the new tax price and responding truthfully yields no benefit to respondents,
the easiest route for respondents could be to say that they would not adjust their nominal
donations. However, counter to this notion, we find significant variation across scenarios
in the proportion who do adjust – often for the same individual.
Tests for differences in responses across the scenarios indicate that significantly more
people respond to changes in the rebate than to changes in the match, and more people
respond to bigger changes in either the match or the rebate.15,16 This is despite the fact
that across all scenarios the implied price changes associated with changes in the rebate
are smaller than those associated with changes in the match.
The different proportions of donors adjusting their nominal donation to match and
rebate changes (column (4)) indicates that the gap between the estimates of match and
rebate elasticities across the sample can at least in part be attributed to compositional
effects with respect to the numbers of those adjusting and those not adjusting rather than
to differences in the magnitude of responses of those who adjust: since the implied price
elasticity of gross donations is−1 for a non-adjuster to the match and 0 for a non-adjuster
to the rebate, a comparatively greater proportion of non-adjusters for the rebate translates
into a comparatively smaller elasticity (in absolute value) for the rebate.
14These estimates are in line with those obtained in the earlier experimental studies on match and rebate
– Eckel and Grossman for example found estimated match elasticities to range from −1.14 to −1.05 and
rebate elasticities to range from −.36 to −.11.
15Tests for the null βs = βs￿ , s ￿= s￿ for scenarios 1-4 (the scenarios reported in Table 1) return P-values of
less than 1%.
16Karlan and List (2007) and Huck and Rasul (2009) find that nominal donations are not sensitive to
changes in the value of a (non-tax) match. While this finding may appear to be consistent with the high
level of non-adjustment in our survey, we do find some cases of nominal donations varying significantly
across scenarios.
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Figure 1: Proportion of donors adjusting nominal donations
The specific response patterns we observe help dispel doubts about the impact of “hy-
pothetical bias” on our survey evidence. As mentioned, one obvious way in which such
bias may affect responses is by inducing individuals to report no change: since no ac-
tual donation is involved, respondents may find it easiest to report no adjustment even
though they would adjust if an actual donation was involved. Or, for analogous reasons,
we may expect certain individuals to report an adjustment picked at random. Both kinds
of bias would affect estimates of overall responses, but there is no reason to expect that
they would do so asymmetrically for match and rebate changes – particularly with re-
spect to the proportions of respondents who say they would adjust to one but not the
other.17
17In addition, the scenarios presented to respondents are “visually similar” (the same figures in terms of
pence per pound feature in scenarios involving changes in the match and in the rebate); and, as already
noted, the actual price changes involved are greater for the match than they are for the rebate – and yet
more respondents report adjustment for the rebate than for the match.
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3 Candidate explanations
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows:
(i) Gross donations respondmore to a change in thematch than to an equivalent change
in the rebate.
(ii) Most donors do not change their nominal donationwith respect to a change in either
the match or the rebate.
(iii) More donors adjust their nominal donations to a change in the rebate than to a
change in the match.
(iv) The probability of adjusting is increasing in the size of the donation.
These findings are inconsistent with a simple, stylized model of rational giving choices.
The finding of differential responses across match and rebate is in line with evidence
from earlier experimental studies (although those studies were not focusing on broad
based instruments). The other patterns have not been identified by those earlier stud-
ies, nor can they be readily explained by the basic rational model; but they can tell us
something about (i), pointing to possible explanations for it.
Below we discuss alternative explanations for these patterns, in light of the relevant
theoretical constructs and in light of our evidence.
Administrative costs
One possible explanation for our findings that is consistent with rational behaviour could
be that there are some additional, unmeasured costs attached to the rebate (e.g. admin-
istrative costs for the donor associated with having to reclaim the rebate) but not to the
match. In our sample, 44.1% of higher-rate taxpayers reported that they did not reclaim
the additional higher-rate relief. As expected, the probability of reclaiming is closely
linked to the amount donated – from fewer than 20% of those who give a few pounds
a year through Gift Aid to around 75% of those who give more than 2,000 a year – this
suggests the presence of administrative costs that are less than proportional to the amount
reclaimed.
Table 2 summarizes responses to the treatments for reclaimers and non-reclaimers.
Amongst reclaimers the proportion of adjusters is greater for the rebate than it is for the
match, the gap between the two being even greater than for the sample as a whole (Table
1). Amongst non-reclaimers the pattern is the same but the gap is smaller.
Administrative costs associated with reclaiming the rebate, or with changing the a-
mount reclaimed relative to the baseline, could not explain why more reclaimers change
their nominal donation in response to a change in the rebate than they do in response to
a change in the match. On the contrary, such costs would imply the reverse adjustment
11
Table 2: Responses – reclaimers and non-reclaimers
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Main results   
  Regression results: 
Dependent variable = 
 ln (gross donation) 
  
 
Scenario 
Treatment: 
     m = match 
      r  = rebate 
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Standard 
Error 
(3) 
Implied 
elasticity  
(4) Proportion of 
donors adjusting 
nominal donation 
Current m = 0.25, r = 0.25     
A.1 m = 0.30, r = 0.25    .0543 (.0046) !1.42 .108 
A.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.30    .0332 (.0047)   !.50 .243 
Number of respondents = 288 
B.1 m = 0.20, r = 0.25 !.0353 (.0046)  !.85 .059 
B.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.20   .0062 (.0047)    .09 .123 
Number of respondents = 287 
Total number of respondents (all treatments) =     1,442 
Total number of observations                         =     4,216 
 
Results, by whether or not higher-rate taxpayer reclaims 
  
Regression results: 
Dependent variable = 
ln (gross donation) 
  
 
Scenario 
Treatment: 
     m = match 
      r  = rebate 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(2) 
Standard
Error 
(3) 
Implied 
elasticity  
(4) Proportion of 
donors adjusting 
nominal donation 
Non-reclaimers      
A.1 m = 0.30, r = 0.25    .0417 (.0063) !1.09 .060 
A.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.30    .0137 (.0063)   !.21 .090 
B.1 m = 0.20, r = 0.25  !.0329 (.0065)  !.79 .024 
B.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.20    .0204 (.0065)     .31 .120 
Number of respondents                                  =    259 
Total number of respondents (all treatments) =    633 
Total number of observations                         = 1,870 
Reclaimers      
A.1 m = 0.30, r = 0.25    .0654 (.0064) !1.71 .149 
A.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.30    .0505 (.0065)   !.76 .378 
B.1 m = 0.20, r = 0.25  !.0372 (.0063)       !.89 .086 
B.2 m = 0.25, r = 0.20  !.0050 (.0063)   !.08 .225 
Number of respondents                                  =    316 
Total number of respondents (all treatments) =    809 
Total number of observations                         = 2,345 
 
patterns – fewer reclaimers adjusting to a rebate change than to a match change. For non-
reclaimers, the positive (albeit smaller) gap between the proportion of adjusters for the
rebate and the proportion of adjusters for the match is even harder to link to administra-
tion costs, given that such costs should be irrelevant for them.
Differential warm glow
One could try to rationalize differences in match and rebate elasticities as stemming from
differential warm glow effects, i.e. by supposing that donors do not derive the same
degree of warm glow from increases in the match as they do from increases in the rebate.
For example, if individuals derive warm glow from their nominal (cash) donation, d(i) =
g(i)/(1+m) – the figure they write on their check – they would place a higher value on
an increase in the rebate, and would therefore be comparatively more responsive to it in
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terms of changes in their gross donation.18
However, such an elasticity gap could not by itself explain why there are relatively
more rebate adjusters than match adjusters – unless some other adjustment costs are
present. But more importantly, for adjusters, we should observe a higher elasticity for
the rebate than we do for the match. However, this is not what our survey evidence indi-
cates: for adjusters in set A, for example, the estimated match and rebate elasticities are
respectively −2.28 and −1.72, which still points to a comparatively greater responsive-
ness of gross donations to changes in the match rather than the reverse – which would be
implied by a warm-glow premium for the rebate.19
The observed gap in elasticities for adjusters could be consistent with the so-called en-
dowment effect – the empirical finding that individuals appear to place a higher value on
something that they think they have ownership over relative to the value that they place
on something that they do not view as being theirs (Knetsch, 1989): if donors view their
status quo nominal donation, after any changes in the match or rebate are implemented,
as defining their new “endowment point”, they might attach a higher feeling of owner-
ship on relief given in the form of a rebate than on equivalent relief given as a match; then,
if we interpret this effect with reference to the feelings associated with giving rather than
the feelings associated with the cost of giving, it would translate into a relatively greater
“cold chill” from adjusting donations downwards in response to a match increase in com-
parison with the corresponding level under an equivalent rebate. This could explain why,
for adjusters, gross donations are more responsive to the match than to the rebate; but it
could not explain why more respondents adjust to changes in the rebate than they do for
the match.
Non-salience
Chetty et al. (2009) and Finkelstein (2009) among others have recently provided evidence
that some taxes (sales taxes in Chetty et al.’s study, road charges in Finkelstein’s) are not
salient (not “in evidence”) in consumers’ decisions, and have interpreted this finding as
arising from taxes being “shrouded” attributes.20
Unlike those studies, we can compare equivalent changes in two different tax instru-
ments, but given our survey design, neither is obviously shrouded – we are explicitly
18An analogous premium on the rebate could also stem from nominal donations being motivated by
status-seeking, or from “beat the taxman” attitudes on the part of donors (valuing a tax refund by more
than the amount refunded).
19These estimates are based on a sample size of only 126 observations. Standard errors are .26 and .18
respectively for the match elasticity and the rebate elasticity estimates.
20Gabaix and Laibson (2006) discuss shrouded attributes as being attributes that are hidden from view at
the point of decision-making even though they could be costlessly revealed. Using a field experiment and
exploiting differences in the observability of state and excise duties, Chetty et al. (2009) demonstrate that
consumers behave differently when taxes are revealed.
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telling respondents about the match and rebate rates and relevant changes in them. It
is nevertheless possible that what respondents are reporting is not how their donations
would change if they made their choice at the time when they are filling out the survey,
but rather how they think their donations would change in the future when faced with
the actual choice. In other words, they may be fully aware of the match now, but they
are telling us that the match will probably become shrouded when they actually choose
– respondents are telling us introspectively that the match would be shrouded but the
rebate would be not be at the time of the actual choice. But even so, there is no a priori
reason to expect the match to be more shrouded than the rebate, or viceversa.
Moreover, even if we rationalize differences in adjustment patterns across match and
rebate (our finding (ii)) as being the result of differential, introspective shroudedness
across match and rebate, this does not tell us anything about whether adjustment or non-
adjustment is the result of the relative salience or non-salience of one tax attribute over
another. This is because, there are no obvious grounds for singling out one particular
scenario (if any) over another as reflecting responses that are the result of a fully salient
change in the price of giving. To illustrate this, suppose that we observe that nominal
donations are insensitive to changes in the rebate and to price equivalent changes in the
match. We could then we could think of this pattern as being consistent with a scenario
where the “true” price elasticity of giving is−1, the match is fully salient and the rebate is
non-salient; but we could also take it as being consistent with a scenario where the “true”
price elasticity of giving is 0, the rebate is fully salient and the is non-salient.
One could try to assess which of the above interpretations is more plausible by looking
to the evidence on the responsiveness of donations to changes in the price of giving.
However, as discussed earlier in the paper, literature estimates do not give us clear clues.
Our own implied elasticity estimate for the rebate – equal to −.50 for the full sample
(Table 1, scenario A.2) – is consistent with independent literature estimates, which were
obtained by focusing on the charitable tax deduction for the US case, that lie between 0
and −1. But this does not imply that we should view responses to the rebate as reflecting
the “true” elasticity: those independent estimates may themselves be based on responses
in which changes in the rebate are non-salient. Indeed, it is not even clear that in this
context the concept of price elasticity of giving – the response to a price that incorporates
fully salient attributes – remains meaningful: it may well be that neither match or rebate
are fully salient.
Thus, the concept of non-salience as being associated with “shrouded attributes” does
not seem to be very helpful for interpreting our survey evidence: it is not obviously perti-
nent to an exercise where individuals make choices on paper on the basis of information
explicitly provided to them; even if we were to accept that some tax instruments may be
not salient to respondents’ decisions whilst others are, it cannot help us discern between
alternative patterns of non-salience in our scenarios; it does not tell us why a particular
instrument should be non-salient; and it does not explain our findings (iii) and (iv) – a
higher proportion of adjusters to a change in the rebate than to a change in the rebate,
14
and a higher probability of adjusting for larger donors.
In the next section, we explore an alternative mechanism that may explain (i)-(iv), a
mechanism that is related to the concept of non-salience of attributes but ascribes it to a
deliberate choice by donors rather than to intrinsic shroudedness.
4 Rational inattention
The apparent inattention to changes in the match or to the rebate may be the result of
a rational choice by donors not to process the information that is available to them if
doing so is costly. This conjecture is related to the concept of “limited rationality” as
characterized by Lipman (1991), and to the idea of “rational inattention” that has been
invoked in the macroeconomics literature on price stickiness (Sims, 2006). There is a piece
of evidence from the survey that would seem to point to this interpretation. Respondents
were asked for the main reason why they would not adjust their donations in response
to a change in tax: more than 50% agree with the statement that they make their decision
about how much to give before considering tax incentives; a further 20% agree that the
tax relief has no effect on their decision about how much to give.
The findings of Chetty at al. (2009) and Finkelstein (2009) could also be interpreted in
this light – buyers deliberately choosing not to process the information about the tax. In
our case, the parallel would be with the rebate: i.e. people find it difficult to compute the
net cost of the donation to them. However, this does not obviously conform to our finding
about the match – which also requires processing – unless we suppose that processing a
grossed-up amount from a net amount is informationally less demanding than processing
a net amount from a grossed-up amount. In the case of Chetty at al. (2009), the responses
relate to modes of delivery of the same instrument that may differ exogenously with re-
spect to their degree of salience. In our case, the comparison is between instruments that
are equivalent in terms of their effect on price and that, a priori, should be equally “in
evidence” for donors. However, since donors directly choose nominal rather than gross
donations, the consequences of non-processing are different for the two instruments. Ob-
served processing choices across match and rebate thus convey additional information
that we can relate to the predictions of a rational inattention model.
A simple formalization of rational inattention in the context of giving choices is pre-
sented below. The key predictions that come out of such a framework can be easily antic-
ipated on the basis of standard economic intuition: (i) if the costs of processing the match
and/or the rebate are less than proportional to the size of the donations, then individuals
making large donations will be more likely to process the match and/or the rebate – and
hence to respond to changes in them – than will individuals who make small donations;
(ii) individuals will be more likely to process the match and/or the rebate, tailoring their
donations to them, the greater is the required adjustment in their optimal, unconstrained
nominal donation – the action under their immediate control – for given changes in the
match and/or the rebate.
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4.1 Modelling rational inattention
Rational inattention can be modelled as followed. With reference to the model of rational
donation choices outlined in Section 2, let us abstract from the public good dimension of
giving and suppose that donors only care about their own donation:
U
￿
x(i, t), g(i, t)
￿
= U
￿
y(i)− ￿1− r(t)￿d(i, t), ￿1+m(t)￿d(i, t)￿, (4)
where d(i, t) is i’s nominal donation at time t – the amount the donor writes on the check,
corresponding to the action the donor directly takes – r(t) ∈ R is the rebate rate at t,
and m(t) ∈ M is the match rate at time t. The net donation (the cost of the donation to
the donor) is c(i, t) = (1− r(t))d(i, t), and gross giving – the second argument in U – is
g(i, t) = (1+ m(t))d(i, t) = c(i, t)/p(t), where p(t) = (1− r(t))/(1+ m(t)) is the price
of giving.
Suppose that, prior to making choices in period t, the individual has well defined
beliefs about the probability of different possible values of match and rebate at t, i.e.
Pr
￿
r(t) = r
￿ ≡ π(r), r ∈ R, and Pr ￿m(t) = m￿ ≡ π(m),m ∈M. Also assume that there
is no further donation choice to be made after period t or, equivalently, that observing
m(t) and r(t) conveys no information about the distribution of possible values (m(t), r(t))
at t+ 1.21
Following a given realization of match and rebate rates at time t, the individual can
observe these rates and can process this information by incorporating it into an ex-post
optimal choice. Doing this involves, for each of value of the match and rebate, a non-
monetary cost K(i).22 Alternatively, prior to making choices at t, the individual can de-
cide not to process the match, the rebate, or both, and save the associated cost; in this
case, she will be unable to condition her choice of d(i, t) on the realization of the tax re-
lief parameters, and she will instead have to choose a single value d(i, t) that is optimal
“on average” given her beliefs over possible realizations. To choose to do so rationally,
however, the individual must come to an ex-ante assessment that also incorporates the
values of the possible realizations of the tax relief parameters, which implies that the pro-
cessing must take place even in that case, albeit prospectively, and that a processing cost,
K0, must be incurred even then. Nevertheless, if the processing that is performed ex-ante
does not exonerate the individual from having to process the information again to arrive
21Our arguments could be extended to a dynamic choice framework where mt and rt do convey infor-
mation about future realizations of match and rebate, and where, therefore, individuals use any current
observation to update their beliefs. To be tractable, such an extension would require making simplifying
assumptions about the form of the mechanism generating m(t) and r(t) – e.g. that m(t) and r(t) follow a
Markov process.
22Sims (2006) characterizes rational inattention in terms of constraints on processing capacity, which
means that the cost of processing a piece of information is an opportunity cost, defined by alternative
uses of such capacity. In our context, the simpler characterization we adopt is sufficient for our purposes.
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at an ex-post optimal choice after observing a certain realization, then forgoing to process
information ex-post will involve a lower overall processing cost.
Let the choice of whether or not to process the match and the rebate be respectively
represented by σm(i, t) ∈ {0, 1} and σr(i, t) ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 denotes inattention and
1 denotes attention. Omitting t indices, we then have four possibilities, each yielding
different expected payoffs:
(i) The individual processes both match and rebate; the associated payoff is
EmEr
￿
max
d
U
￿
y− d(1− r), d(1+m)￿￿− K0 − 2K
≡ Γ(σm = 1, σr = 1)− K0 − 2K, (5)
where E[.] is the expectation operator – incorporating the individual’s subjective
beliefs.
(ii) The individual processes the match but not the rebate; the associated payoff is
Em
￿
max
d
Er
￿
U
￿
y− d(1− r), d(1+m)￿￿￿− K0 − K
≡ Γ(σm = 1, σr = 0)− K0 − K, (6)
where the expression within the outer expectation operator is the indirect utility
obtainable by selecting d optimally after processing m but not r.
(iii) The individual processes the rebate but not the match; the associated payoff is
Er
￿
max
d
Em
￿
U
￿
y− d(1− r), d(1+m)￿￿￿− K0 − K
≡ Γ(σm = 0, σr = 1)− K0 − K, (7)
where the expression within the outer expectation operator is the indirect utility
obtainable by selecting d optimally after processing r but not m.
(iv) The individual processes neither match nor rebate; the associated payoff is
max
d
EmEr
￿
U
￿
y− d(1− r), d(1+m)￿￿− K0
≡ Γ(σm = 0, σr = 0)− K0. (8)
Choosing amongst the above four possible configurations, the individual will then ratio-
nally select the processing strategy (σm, σr) that results in the highest expected payoff.
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In order to derive predictions that can be directly related to our survey evidence on
treatment responses, let utility for donor i at time t take the quasilinear, constant-elasticity
form
U
￿
x(i), g(i)
￿
= x(i)+φ(i)−1/η(i) η(i)
1+ η(i)
g(i)(1+η(i))/η(i)
= y− d(i)(1− r) + φ(i)−1/η(i) η(i)
1+ η(i)
￿
d(i)(1+m)
￿(1+η(i))/η(i)
, (9)
with η(i) < 0.
Suppose the status quo position is with match m0 and rebate r0, implying a price of
giving of p0 = (1− r0)/(1+m0). Now suppose that the donor believes that with proba-
bility 2π(i) (π < 1/2) the price of giving changes to p1 and that with probability π(i) this
change occurs as a result of a change in the match from m0 to m1 = (1+m0)(p0/p1)− 1
(with the rebate remaining unchanged at r0), and with probability π(i) the price change
occurs as a result of a change in the rebate from r0 to r1 = 1− (1− r0)(p1/p0) (with the
match remaining unchanged at m0). The probability of both the match and the rebate
changing is thus zero.23
The optimal donation choices for this specification under different processing strate-
gies are detailed in the Appendix, which also derives results concerning the relationship
between parameter choices and optimal processing choices. These can be best summa-
rized and understood by referring to specific elasticity scenarios. Consider first the case
where the price elasticity of giving under full attention is −1; then nominal donations
will never adjust to changes in the match, and therefore no “mistake” is made by not
processing the match. In this case, we would expect the match to never be processed (as
it is irrelevant for the determination of the size of the optimal nominal donation), and
the rebate to be more likely to be processed by large donors than by small donors as not
paying attention to the rebate becomes more costly for larger donations.
Suppose that instead the price elasticity of giving under full attention is 0; then nomi-
nal donations never need to adjust to changes in the rebate. In this case, we would expect
the rebate never to be processed, and the match to be more likely to be processed by large
donors than by small donors. For elasticity values between 0 and −1, nominal dona-
tions need to adjust downwards for increases in the match and upwards for increases in
the rebate, and whether the match or the rebate will be more likely to be processed de-
pends upon how close the elasticity is to either extreme. On the other hand, for elasticity
values greater than unity in absolute value, the adjustment is upwards for increases in
both match and rebate, but the required adjustments in nominal donations for equivalent
changes in the match and rebate is greater for the rebate than it is for the match, implying
23Our analysis and conclusions readily extend to the case where individuals attach different probabilities
to changes in the match and rebate.
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Figure 2: Predicted processing behaviour by different donor types
p0 = 1, p1 = 3/4,π = 1/6
that in that case donors should be more likely to process the rebate than the match, and
no donors should choose to process the match and not the rebate.
As the inattention cost is directly proportional to φ (which is also directly proportional
to donation size), an increase in K has the same effect on processing choices as in increase
in 1/φ – i.e., given all other parameter values, processing choices depend on the ratio
ρ = K/φ.
The relationship between parameters and processing choices is detailed more fully in
Figure 2, which depict regions in (ρ, η) space that each correspond to a different process-
ing behaviour; these were derived from an explicit computation of optimal processing
choices for different parameter configurations, for a given value of π, and for p0 = 1
and p1 = 3/4. For the given values of π, p0, p1, these fully identify processing choices
in the constant elasticity case. Figure 2 refers to a scenario with π = 1/6. The region
labeled as N represents parameter configurations for which neither match nor rebate are
processed – which occurs for low levels of donations (relative to processing costs) and/or
for elasticity values that are close to unity in absolute value. The region labeled as R
represents parameter configurations for which only the rebate is processed – this occurs
for comparatively larger donations (relative to processing costs), and for elasticity values
that are greater than 1/2 in absolute value. When the elasticity parameter is less than 1/2
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in absolute value, then it is possible for only the match to be processed – region M in the
figure. In the region labeled as B, both match and rebate are processed. Finally, when η is
close to one in absolute value, variations in η have little effect on processing choices, and
specifically on the choice of whether to process both match and rebate or rebate only (the
boundary between regions B and R becomes vertical in the neighbourhood of |η| = 1).
4.2 Survey evidence on rational inattention
Choices consistent with rational inattention should exhibit the following patterns:
(a) The choice to adjust nominal donations following changes in the match or the rebate
should be (weakly) positively correlated with the size of nominal donations;
(b) If donations are sufficiently price-elastic, more individuals will adjust their nomi-
nal donations to changes in the rebate than to changes in the match, and individ-
uals who are adjusters when the match changes are also adjusters when the rebate
changes;
(c) Responses are comparatively more consistent (in terms of implied price elasticities)
across match and rebate for adjusters than for non-adjusters.
(d) If the underlying full-attention price elasticity is close to unity on absolute value,
there will be little systematic difference, in terms of implied price elasticity, across
individuals who respond to both match and rebate changes and those who respond
only to rebate changes; but individuals making larger donations should be signifi-
cantly more likely to respond to both.
These predicted patterns are in line with our findings.
A large proportion of all donors leave their nominal donations unchanged (Table 1,
column 4), which largely accounts for the gap of about one between the implied aggre-
gate price elasticities estimated from responses respectively to changes in the match and
to changes in the rebate (Table 1, column 3). This is consistent with a large fraction of
individuals choosing not to process changes in either match or rebate (types in region N
in Figure 2). For individuals who do adjust, the gap between implied price elasticities of
responses for match and rebate is considerably narrower than for the sample as a whole.
As noted earlier, the estimated match and rebate elasticities for adjusters in set A, for ex-
ample, are respectively −2.28 and −1.72; the corresponding figures for the full sample
(Table 1) are −1.42 and −.50.
Note that in order to directly relate the previous theoretical predictions to survey re-
sponses, we need to think of them as resulting from a scenariowhere beliefs are stationary,
i.e. where both the initial and the new donation arise from processing choices made un-
der the same beliefs concerning the likelihood of different realizations of match/rebate
combinations. Thus, for example, if we interpret observed responses to a change in the
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rebate as corresponding to the case where individuals only process the rebate, then the
predicted change in nominal donations would be from expression (18) in the Appendix –
corresponding to an initial situation where no change is observed in either match or re-
bate – expression (14) in the Appendix – corresponding to a new situation where a change
in the rebate is observed and processed.
This implies that, given that under partial attention (to the rebate), an observed rebate
level of r0 results in a level of nominal donations that undershoots the corresponding
full-attention level, the measured price elasticity of donations derived from observed re-
sponses to changes in the rebate must be greater, in absolute value, than the underlying
elasticity in preferences. The gap between observed and “true” elasticity under partial
inattention is shown in Figure 3, for different values of η. This predicted gap implies that
the observed response by individuals who only adjust to changes in the rebate overstates
the “true” elasticity, i.e. a measured rebate elasticity well in excess of one in absolute
value can be consistent with an underlying “true” elasticity that is much closer to unity
in absolute value. This means that our findings of price elasticities closer to two in ab-
solute value for adjusters need not be inconsistent with a scenario where the underlying
elasticity is not much larger than one.
21
Also consistently with our notion of rational inattention, donors making larger do-
nations are more likely to adjust (Figure 1).24 25 More individuals respond to changes in
the rebate than to changes in the match, and most of those who respond to the match
also respond to the rebate (Table 3). These patterns are consistent with a scenario where
the “true” elasticity is greater than unity in absolute value for most donors, and where
some donors are of types that lie in region R – corresponding to comparatively lower
elasticity values – and others are of types lying in region B – corresponding to compar-
atively higher elasticity values and thus exhibiting larger responses. These patterns also
go against a scenario where the “true” elasticity is close to zero – as the proportion of
donors only adjusting to changes in the match and not to changes in the rebate is very
small (Table 4).
To examine the relationship between donation size and processing responses, we ex-
plored the following multinomial logit specification:
ln(π ji/π
N
i ) = γ
j + λj ln g0i + u
j
i , j ∈ {M,R, B} (10)
where πNi refers to the probability of individual i processing neither match nor rebate,
π
j
i , j ∈ {M,R, B} refers to the probability of qualitatively different processing responses –
respectively only responding to changes in the match, only responding to changes in the
rebate, responding to both changes – and g0i is i’s initial donation. Results are reported in
Table 6. Donation size appears to be a significant determinant of the choice of processing
both match and rebate. In the case of the choice of processing only the rebate, the coef-
ficient for donation size is positive but is not statistically significant. There are very few
instances in the sample where individuals only process the match, and the corresponding
coefficients are statistically insignificant.26
24As we do not model the decision to reclaim the rebate, remaining silent as to its reasons, we have
included in Figure 1 both reclaimers and non-reclaimers. Nevertheless, a similar pattern emerges if we
focus only on reclaimers.
25An analogous finding is reported by Scholnick et al. (2008) with reference to credit card repayments.
Note that this interpretation requires that the processing cost must not be perfectly (positively) correlated
with the size of the donation. While in our quasi-linear specification processing costs, K, are exogenous and
specified independently of φ, one could imagine that they could be endogenously related to donation size
in a more general specification. Suppose for example that processing only requires time, and that individ-
uals have identical preferences but differ with the respect to the market value of their time (i.e. their wage);
then, if giving is a normal good, higher-productivity individuals would donate more and would also face
higher processing costs – implying that we should expect a strong positive correlation between donation
size and processing costs and thus significant clustering around specific processing choices, independently
of donation size. Even in such a scenario, however, a positive correlation between donation size and pro-
cessing choices could arise if some of the processing costs are not related to time inputs, or if income is not
perfectly correlated to the market value of time (e.g. in the case of individuals who are retired).
26Focusing on individuals who process at least the rebate, we also ran a multinomial logit regression to
look at how the choice between processing only the rebate and processing both match and rebate is related
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Table 3: Conditional probability of adjusting nominal donations
Proportion who adjust donations when the rebate changes
 3 
Conditional probabilities of adjusting 
Proportion who adjust when the rebate changes 
 
Proportion of adjusters 
amongst donors who… 
When rebate 
changes 
When rebate 
increases 
When rebate 
decreases 
                  All     
…don’t adjust to the match .154 .202 .107 
…adjust to the match .679 .697 .657 
           Reclaimers    
…don’t adjust to the match .201 .305 .108 
…adjust to the match .750 .875 .563 
 
 
Conditional probabilities of adjusting 
Proportion who adjust when the match changes 
 
Proportion of adjusters 
amongst donors who… 
When match 
changes 
When match 
increases 
When match 
decreases 
                  All     
…don’t adjust to the rebate .039 .047 .032 
…adjust to the rebate .319 .307 .341 
           Reclaimers    
…don’t adjust to the rebate .043 .032 .050 
…adjust to the rebate .349 .344 .360 
Table 4: Conditional probability of adjusting nominal donations
Proportion who adjust donations when the match changes
 3 
Conditional probabilities of adjusting 
Proportion who adjust when the rebate changes 
 
Proportion of adjusters 
amongst donors who… 
When rebate 
changes 
When rebate 
increases 
When rebate 
decreases 
                  All     
don’t adjust to the match .154 .202 .107 
…adjust to the match .679 .697 .657 
           Reclaimers    
…don’t adjust to the match .201 .305 .108 
…adjust to the match .750 .875 .563 
 
 
Conditional probabilities of adjusting 
Proportion who adjust when the match changes 
 
Proportion of adjusters 
amongst donors who… 
When match 
changes 
When match 
increases 
When match 
decreases 
                  All     
don’t adjust to the rebate .039 .047 .032 
…adjust to the rebate .319 .307 .341 
           Reclaimers    
don’t adjust to the rebate .043 .032 .050 
…adjust to the rebate .349 .344 .360 
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Table 5: Processing behaviour – multinomial logit regression results
 4 
 
 
Multinomial logit  
  
Dependent variable = ln (odds of response pattern) 
Treatment sets A and B 
Baseline: no adjustment 
 
   Adjustment 
      in response to changes in … 
 
…match 
 only 
…rebate 
only 
…both 
Constant    
         Coefficient !4.474 !2.954 !6.433 
         Standard Error  (1.173)    (.538)    (.936) 
ln (initial donation)    
         Coefficient   .101   .123     .541 
         Standard Error  (.197)  (.090)    (.133) 
Number of respondents = 583 
 
 
5 Summary and conclusion
As charitable donations choices are made in terms of expenditure levels rather than quan-
tities, comparing the effect of different but equivalent tax incentives for giving can pro-
vide further insights on how individuals’ choices take tax attributes into account, and
why.
In line with earlier experimental evidence, our survey evidence shows that, when
faced with changes in tax parameters, donors, in aggregate, adjust their gross donations
significantly more to a change in the match on nominal donations than they do to a cor-
responding change in the tax rebate.
These findings cannot be readily explained by the inclusion in a standard model of
rational giving choices of additional effects stemming from donations – such as adminis-
trative costs or differential warm-glow effects. Rather, the kind of responses that emerge
from our survey are in line with the predictions of a model of rationally inattentive
choices. Moreover, in light of those predictions, the patterns and magnitude of observed
responses can be viewed as being consistent with earlier aggregate literature estimates of
the price elasticity of giving, once we make allowances for heterogeneity across donors
to the size of observed responses. According to our theoretical characterization of rational inattention, if
the underlying elasticity is not far from unity in absolute value, we should expect processing choices not
to vary much in relation to differences in the the relative size of responses (reflecting elasticity differences
– see Figure 2) but to be very sensitive to differences in donation size. Albeit based on a sample of only 75
observations, regression results (not reported) are consistent with this pattern.
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with respect to their individual preference and processing cost characteristics.
Whether the observed non-salience of tax instruments is the result of rational inatten-
tion has direct implications for policy design. In particular, if non-salience is the result
of rational inattention, non-adjustment involves an implicit savings in processing costs,
which needs to be accounted for when comparing the welfare implications of salient and
non-salient instruments.
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Appendix Rational inattention in giving
Case I – Full attention (σm = 1; σr = 1) Under full attention, the optimal nominal donation in
each realization is identified by (omitting the i identifier)
d f (m, r) = φpη/(1+m), (11)
where p = (1− r)/(1+m). The payoff in each realization is
v f (m, r) ≡ 1− d f (m, r)(1− r) + φ−1/η η
1+ η
￿
d f (m, r)(1+m)
￿(1+η)/η , (12)
with v f (m1, r0) = v f (m0, r1). The expected payoff under full attention, gross of processing costs,
is then
Γ(σm = 1, σr = 1) = (1− 2π)v f (m0, r0) + 2π v f (m1, r0) ≡ ΥB. (13)
Case II – Attention to the rebate only (σm = 0; σr = 1) If the individual chooses to process the
rebate but not the match, then donation choices must be separately derived for each of the two
possible realizations the rebate, (i) r = r1, and (ii) r = r0 – which are fully observed and processed
– on the basis of the expected payoff associated with a given choice under each possible rebate
realization.
(i) If r1 is observed and processed, then the nominal donation will be the same as that under
full attention when the price of giving is p1. This is because, conditional on the change in
the rebate having occurred, the match is m0 with probability one27, i.e.
dr(r1) = d f (m0, r1). (14)
In this case, which occurs with probability π, the donor’s payoff will be
vr(r1) = v f (m0, r1). (15)
(ii) If r0 is observed, then m1 will occur with probability ξ = π/(1− π)28, and so the ex-ante
optimal interior choice of nominal donation is characterized by the first-order condition
φ−1/ηd1/η
￿
ξ(1+m1)(1+η)/η + (1− ξ)(1+m0)(1+η)/η
￿
= 1− r0. (16)
Substituting m1 = (1+m0)(p0/p1)− 1 into the above, we can rewrite expression (16) as
φ−1/ηd1/η(1+m0)(1+η)/η
￿
1− ξ + ξ(p0/p1)(1+η)/η
￿
= 1− r0. (17)
27The probability of m0 occurring conditional on the realization r1 is Pr{m0|r1} = Pr{m0 ∩ r1}/Pr{r1} =
(1− π)/(1− π) = 1.
28Pr{m1|r0} = Pr{m1 ∩ r0}/Pr{r0} = π/(1− π).
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Solving for d then yields
dr(r0) = φ
(p0)η
1+m0
￿
1
1− ξ + ξ(p1/p0)−(1+η)/η
￿η
. (18)
Note that for η = −1 this coincides with the choice under full attention to the match, i.e.,
dr(r0) = d f (r0,m0) = d f (r0,m1), and so no “mistake” is made by not processing the match.
This choice results in an expected payoff of
vr(r0) ≡ 1− dr(r0)(1− r0)+
φ−1/η η
1+ η
dr(r0)(1+η)/η(1+m0)(1+η)/η
￿
1− ξ + ξ(p0/p1)(1+η)/η
￿
, (19)
which occurs with probability 1− π.
Combining the results obtained under (i) and (ii) above, the overall level of expected utility under
full attention to the rebate only, gross of processing costs, is
Γ(σm = 0, σr = 1) = πvr(r1) + (1− π)vr(r0) ≡ ΥR. (20)
Case III – Attention to the match only (σm = 1; σr = 0) If the individual chooses to process the
match but not the rebate, then donation choices must be separately derived for each of the two
possible realizations of the match, (i) m = m1, and (ii) m = m0 – which are fully observed and
processed – on the basis of the expected payoff associated with a given choice under each possible
match realization.
(i) The result is the same as that in Case II(i) above. That is, if m1 is observed and processed
then the nominal donation will be the same as that under full attention when the price of
giving is p1. This is because, conditional on the change in the match having occurred, the
rebate is r0 with probability one29, i.e.
dm(m1) = d f (m1, r0) = d f (m0, r1). (21)
In this case, which occurs with probability π, the donor’s payoff will be
vm(m1) = v f (m0, r1). (22)
(ii) If m0 is observed, then r1 will occur with probability ξ = π/(1− π)30, and so the ex-ante
optimal interior choice of nominal donation is characterized by the first-order condition
φ−1/ηd1/η(1+m0)(1+η)/η = ξ(1− r1) + (1− ξ)(1− r0). (23)
29Pr{r0|m1} = Pr{r0 ∩m1}/Pr{m1} = (1− π)/(1− π) = 1.
30Pr{r1|m0} = Pr{r1 ∩m0}/Pr{m0} = π/(1− π).
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Substituting r1 = 1 − (1 − r0)(p1/p0) into the above and solving for the ex-ante optimal
choice of nominal donation, dm(m0), yields
dm(m0) = φ
(p0)η
1+m0
￿
1− ξ + ξ(p1/p0)
￿η . (24)
Note that with η = 0 this coincides with the choice under full attention to the rebate, i.e.,
dm(m0) = d f (r0,m0) = d f (r1,m0), and so no “mistake” is made by not processing the rebate.
This choice results in an expected payoff
vm(m0) ≡ 1− dm(m0)(1− r0)
￿
1− ξ + ξ(p1/p0)
￿
+φ−1/η η
1+ η
dm(m0)(1+η)/η(1+m0)(1+η)/η . (25)
Combining the results obtained under (i) and (ii) above, the overall level of expected utility under
full attention to the match only, gross of processing costs, is
Γ(σm = 1, σr = 0) = πvm(m1) + (1− π)vm(m0) ≡ ΥM. (26)
Case IV – No attention (σm = 0; σr = 0) Proceeding as for the other cases, if the individual for-
goes to process both the match and the rebate, then her ex-ante optimal interior choice of nominal
donation is characterized by the first order condition
φ−1/ηd1/η
￿
π(1+m1)(1+η)/η + (1− π)(1+m0)(1+η)/η
￿
= π(1− r1) + (1− π)(1− r0). (27)
Substituting r1 = 1− (1− r0)(p1/p0) and m1 = (1+ m0)(p0/p1)− 1 into the above and solving
for the ex-ante optimal choice of nominal donation, dn, yields
dn = φ
(p0)η
1+m0
￿
1− π + π(p1/p0)
1− π + π(p1/p0)−(1+η)/η
￿η
. (28)
This choice results in an expected payoff, gross of processing cost, equal to
vn ≡ 1− dn(1− r0)
￿
1− π + π(p1/p0)
￿
+φ−1/η η
1+ η
￿
dn(1+m0)
￿(1+η)/η ￿1− π + π(p0/p1)(1+η)/η￿ = Γ(σm = 0, σr = 0) ≡ ΥN . (29)
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Processing choices
Consider next a distribution of processing cost types, K, having support K = [K,K]; a distribution
of φ types, having supportP = [φ, φ]; and a distribution of elasticity types, η, having supportN =
[η, η]; and assume that individual characteristics K(i), φ(i), η(i), are independently distributed
across individuals.
Focus first on the choice between processing neither match nor rebate and processing the
match. The cost type K˜N,M(φ, η) ∈ K, for given levels η and φ, who will be indifferent between
processing neither match nor rebate and processing the match will be identified by the condition
ΥN = ΥM − K˜N,M, which can be rewritten as
K˜N,M = ΥM − ΥN . (30)
As the difference ΥM − ΥN is linear in φ, the difference between the left- and right-hand sides of
(30) is linearly homogenous in (K, φ), which means that (30) can only uniquely identify a value
ρ˜N,M corresponding to all of those combinations (K, φ) for which K/φ = ρ˜N,M. Thus, dividing
both sides of (30) by φ, and letting Ψj = Υj/φ, j ∈ {N,M,R, B}, we can rewrite (30) as
ρ˜N,M = ΨM −ΨN . (31)
Then, an individual of cost type K(i) and valuation type φ(i) will choose to process the match
if K(i)/φ(i) ≤ ρ˜M, and will choose not to process the match otherwise. As φ is directly related
to the size of the donation, this implies that, for a given level of attention cost, the proportion
of individuals choosing to process the match will be comparatively greater for donor types that
make comparatively larger donations. Proceeding in the same way, we can derive values
ρ˜N,R = ΨR −ΨN , (32)
and
ρ˜N,B =
1
2
￿
ΨB −ΨN￿, (33)
that respectively identify individual types that are indifferent between processing neither match
nor rebate and processing the rebate, and individual types that are indifferent between processing
neither match nor rebate and processing both. And as for the match, we can conclude that, for a
given level of attention cost, the proportion of individuals choosing to process the rebate or both
match and rebate will be comparatively greater for donor types making larger donations.
Let us next focus on the choice between processing only the match and processing both match
and rebate. The corresponding critical ratio ρ = K/φ for indifference between the two is
ρ˜M,B = ΨB −ΨM. (34)
For η = 0, we have ΨB = ΨM (as no mistake is made by not processing the rebate), and therefore
ρ˜M,B = 0; for η < 0, not processing the rebate involves a mistake, and so ρ˜M,B > 0. With respect to
the choice between processing only the rebate and processing both match and rebate, we have
ρ˜R,B = ΨB −ΨR. (35)
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For η = −1, we have ΨB = ΨR (as no mistake is made by not processing the match), and therefore
ρ˜R,B = 0. Then, for η = −1 (and in a neighbourhood of −1),
ρ˜R,B < ρ˜M,B, (36)
and
ΨR > ΨM; (37)
i.e. there will exist individual types for which ρ˜R,B < K/φ and for which processing only the
rebate will be preferable to processing both match and rebate as well as to processing only the
match. Noting that ρ˜N,R = ΨR − ΨN = ΨB − ΨN − ρ˜R,B, and since ρ˜R,B = 0 for η = −1, we can
also conclude that, for η = −1 (and in a neighbourhood of −1),
ρ˜R,B < ρ˜N,R, (38)
and so
ΨR > ΨN ; (39)
i.e. there will exist individual types for which ρ˜R,B < K/φ < ρ˜N,R and for which processing only
the rebate will be preferable to processing both match and rebate as well as to processing neither.
Together, (36)-(39) imply that, for |η| close to unity, there will be individual types for which
K/φ < ρ˜R,B and for which it will be optimal to process both match and rebate; individual types
for which K/φ > ρ˜R,B and for which it will be optimal to process only the rebate; and there will
be no individual types for which it will be optimal to process only the match.
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